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Abstract The ultimate utility of science is widely agreed
upon: the comprehension of reality. But there is much
controversy about what scientific understanding actually
means, and how we should proceed in order to gain new
scientific understanding. Is there a method for acquiring
new scientific knowledge? Is this method unique and uni-
versal? There has been no shortage of proposals, but nei-
ther has there been a shortage of skeptics about these
proposals. This article proffers for discussion a potential
scientific method that aspires to be unique and universal
and is rooted in the recent and ancient history of scientific
thinking. Curiously, conclusions can be inferred from this
scientific method that also concern education and the
transmission of science to others.
Keywords Comprehension  Observation  Reality 
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Three Concepts, Three Hypotheses, Three Principles
and Three Benefits
A possible agreement on a single scientific method (SM)
would be of high interest both to theory and practice. It
would be especially useful to theory because a single, uni-
versal SM would make it possible to agree on a definition of
science: science is that knowledge arrived at using the SM.
The most widely held view on this issue today revolves
around the belief that there is no SM that has endured
unchanged throughout history and in every discipline. The
history of the philosophy of science has amassed various
methodologies, each one suited ideally for a particular
purpose, and each with its advantages and drawbacks
depending on the type of reality being examined with a view
to understanding it. Moreover, a single, universal SM would
also be useful for creating new scientific knowledge as well
as for assessing or criticizing the scientific knowledge that
holds sway today. Universality, coherence, and uniqueness
are intuitions to be demanded of a possible SM.
The understanding of reality is an accomplishment of the
mind that depends on the interaction between the subject and
the object of knowledge, that is to say, on observation. Con-
sequently, the most basic conceptual schema revolves around
these three concepts: (1) reality, (2) observation (of that real-
ity), and (3) understanding (of that observation of that reality).
‘‘The Three Fundamental Concepts (a Conceptual Schema)’’
section defines these three concepts, and analyzes the rela-
tionships between them. ‘‘The Three Fundamental Hypotheses
(the Limits of Scientific Understanding)’’ section outlines
three fundamental hypotheses, one for each concept. These
hypotheses establish the first limits of scientific knowledge,
that (1) reality is observable, (2) observation is understandable,
and (3) understanding is falsifiable. Reality can only be
understood scientifically within the limits set by these three
hypotheses. It is impossible to do the science of a reality that
cannot be observed either directly or indirectly. Nor is it
possible to do science based on an unintelligible observation,
even though the reality is observable. And neither is it possible
to do science based on an understandable observation if it turns
out that it is not falsifiable, even though the reality is obser-
vable and the observation understandable.
These three fundamental concepts, established by their
respective hypotheses, create the conditions for proposing an
SM based on three fundamental principles. ‘‘The Three Fun-
damental Principles (Scientific Method)’’ section details these
principles, one for each concept and its corresponding
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hypothesis. The most characteristic and novel aspect of this
proposal is that these principles are not dictates that compel
scientists to use a particular methodology but instead set a trend
to be followed. In other words, each of the principles of the SM
transpires with a degree of compliance that must be as high as
possible in each instance. The more complex the slice of reality
to be understood scientifically, the more difficult it will be to
observe, and the weaker the application of the SM. For example,
SM will go further in understanding the trajectory of a billiard
ball once hit than it will in understanding the behavior of a
family group of gorillas. However, the two sorts of knowledge
will be equally scientific in both cases if the SM is taken as far as
it can possibly go. Plainly, accepting the SM will require certain
sacrifices on the part of the mind creating knowledge (which an
artist, for example, does not necessarily have to accept), but in
exchange the knowledge acquired will exhibit certain interest-
ing features. As will be shown in ‘‘The Three Fundamental
Benefits of the Scientific Method (the Nature of Scientific
Comprehension)’’ section, there is a clear epistemological
benefit for each fundamental principle of the method, namely
(1) universality, (2) anticipatability, and (3) progress.
The final section, ‘‘The Three Intellectual Joys (Psy-
chology of the Acquisition of New Scientific Knowledge:
Research and Education),’’ discusses three psychological
effects of scientific comprehension. Curiously, a type of
intellectual joy occurs associated with each of the funda-
mental principles of the schema (and hence associated with
each of the fundamental concepts, and each of the hypoth-
eses and fundamental benefits of the method). These are: (1)
intellectual joy through stimulus, (2) intellectual joy through
conversation, and (3) intellectual joy through understanding.
The most attractive aspect of this conclusion is its direct
connection with the principles of the method. In other
words, the SM is useful not only for developing science but
also for passing it on to others. Again: the SM is relevant to
new scientific knowledge, whether ‘‘new’’ refers to a single
mind (education) or to any other mind (research).
Three Fundamental Concepts (A Conceptual Schema)
Let us call ‘‘knowledge’’ every mental representation of
reality that can be transferred from one mind to another. This
perhaps is the difference between knowledge and thinking.
A thought can occur inside a mind without a specific
expression in a specific language, and it may very well never
leave the mind in which it occurred. A piece of knowledge,
in contrast, is supported and carried by a slice of reality,
since it is reality that it must traverse in order to reach any
other mind. Consequently, all knowledge is necessarily
finite. A piece of knowledge has weight; it has a size that can
be measured in numbers of symbols or packets of symbols.
In particular, a thought that cannot be transferred (cannot
leap from one mind to another) does not attain the status of
knowledge. Any piece of knowledge carrier begins and ends,
it occupies a space, be it a written text, a musical score, a
painting, a sculpture, or a scientific theory.
I commented earlier that the central intuition that the SM
we seek must fulfill is its usefulness for understanding
reality. But what purpose does understanding reality serve?
There is one utility that is plain to see in history—to survive.
This is the crucial point of connection between two concepts
of key importance: natural selection and cultural selection.
This idea leads us to two others. In effect, an understanding
of reality that anticipates uncertainty ought to enjoy two
types of universality. One of these is internal independence:
the understanding should be as independent as possible of
the mind that devised it; in other words, as little precon-
ceived ideology should be invested in the process as possi-
ble. The second is external independence: understanding
should be as independent as possible of the particular slice of
reality that we want to understand, and also of the time and
place in which this understanding arises. In addition, the
comprehension of reality always involves observation, and
the manner in which observing is done may suffer from
limitations that change with time and place. This means that
if observation changes (improves), understanding is also
liable to change (improvement). This is the third intuition:
the ability of science to progress. So here we have the three
first intuitions that the SM we seek must meet: universality,
the capacity for anticipation, and the capacity for progress.
These three first intuitions require the mind to be
capable of perceiving and recording reality and the changes
it undergoes. This means that in addition to the concepts of
reality and its understanding, a third fundamental concept
must mediate between them: the perception or observation
of reality. This, then, is the tripod of the conceptual schema
on which the SM must rest:
Reality
There is a triple zero hypothesis prior to the establishment of
scientific understanding: (1) reality exists; (2) a mind
capable of understanding it also exists; and (3) a certain
interaction between them is possible. In particular, the mind
is capable of perceiving reality and of organizing successive
perceptions in order to observe it. With these opening words,
we have already named the three fundamental concepts of
the schema we want to build: reality, observation, and
comprehension. The necessary definitions are given below.
Slice of Reality R(X, s)
Slice of reality R(X, s) is a distribution of matter, energy,
and information contained within a X region of space and a




Real object RO is a slice of reality for a particular instant
t
”




Real phenomenon RP is a slice of reality for r points of the
space of a volume vCX being fixed, i.e., R(r
”
vCX, s).
The object of a piece of scientific knowledge always
refers to a slice of reality. We will assume that the reality
exists even when there is no observer in a position to per-
ceive it. The perception of reality depends on the time and
place. To the naked eye, perceivable reality is in fact very
limited: the slice of reality may be imperceptible because it
is too large or too small, too opaque or too transparent, too
far away or too close, too quick or too slow, too complex,
and so forth. Over the course of history the mind has man-
aged to widen perceivable reality with the help of instru-
ments that act as exosomatic extensions of the ability to see
(telescopes, microscopes, high- and low-speed cameras,
scanners that operate at different frequencies, etc.).
Observation (of Reality)
To perceive reality implies a kind of conversation between a
mind and a slice of reality. The mind devises a representation
of a slice of reality by using some kind of language. When the
perceptions are programmed in accordance with precon-
ceived criteria, the perception is called observation. When
the observation arises from imposing certain particular
conditions, the observation is called experimentation. These
are the definitions linked to this concept that we require.
Language Lm
Language Lm is the collection of m words (letters, mag-
nitudes, variables, notes, lines, symbols, etc.) that are
combined to compose phrases (propositions, equations,
images, sounds, etc.), and with them texts that are
employed to represent a slice of reality.
A perception Lm R
A perception Lm R of a slice of reality R is a text of words
and propositions in a language Lm that represents a slice of
reality R with a particular spatial resolution DX and a
particular temporal resolution Ds.
The Spatial Resolution DX
The spatial resolution DX of a piece of knowledge is the
size of the region of space in which the representation is (or
is considered to be) invariant. The temporal resolution Ds
of a representation is the length of the period of time in
which the representation is (or is considered to be)
invariant. The size |Lm R| of a perception Lm R is the
number of symbols (letters, words, propositions, etc.) used
in it. The universe of reference U of a slice of reality R is a
set of slices of reality Rj constructed or selected bearing in
mind the differences with R: {R,Rj} for j = 1,2,…n.
An Observation O
An observation O of a slice of reality R is the set of rep-
resentations in accordance with Lm of all the m slices of
reality of a universe of reference included in the slice R to
be observed:
O ¼ LmR; LmR j
 
j ¼ 1; 2; . . .m:
The Size |O|
The size |O| of an observation is the number of words in Lm
of the representation.
Every observation of reality consists, then, of percep-
tions of reality. It is quite possible for a reality to be per-
ceived but for it to be difficult or impossible to observe. For
example, the elliptical trajectory of a planet around a star is
perfectly observable if it is perceivable because we can
break down the movement into spatial and temporal ele-
ments in order to ascertain the differences between simi-
larities (a single planet around a single star, different
planets around the same star, different planets around dif-
ferent stars, etc.). The behavior of a galaxy can be per-
ceived in an instant, but its evolution over time is difficult
to observe due to its slowness in relation to the time
allotted to an observer. In this situation, however, it is
always possible to construct a universe of reference using
the perception of different galaxies of different ages in
different conditions. In contrast, what we call a mystical
experience can be perceived, but it is very difficult to
observe. With these intuitions, we can already put forward
two of the fundamental concepts of the schema we wish to
build: reality and understanding (of reality).
The concept of observation can be summed up as a
construction achieved by means of differences between
similar realities.
Comprehension (of the Observation of Reality)
Arriving at an understanding of reality is the central con-
cept of the SM. Curiously, it admits of a definition sym-
metrical with the earlier concept of observation. If the
observation is a construction built up of differences
between similarities, then understanding can be defined as
a construction achieved by similarities between different
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realities. As in the case of observation, understanding
requires a language.
A Comprehension C
A comprehension C (of an observation O of a slice of
reality R in relation to a universe of reference {R,Rj}) is a
representation in accordance with Lm of the possible
intersections between the slice of reality R and the other
slices of reality that make up the universe of reference Rj,
that is to say, an understanding is a representation of
similarities between differences.
That is, for a particular language Lm, understanding can
be represented as
C ¼ fR \ R j; R \ Ri \ R j; R \ Ri \ R j \ Rk; . . .g for
i; j; k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; q
In other words, understanding is made up of everything
shared in common by the various slices of reality of the
prepared universe under observation.
Accurate observation of the motion of the planets, for
example, leads to a differential equation that compresses
all understanding of such a slice of reality. And from such
an understanding, it is possible to anticipate and reconstruct
the motion of any planet in any galaxy in the universe.
However, some things are not scientifically under-
standable. In the case of a mystical experience, scientific
comprehension seems unattainable. The experience in itself
is perceivable, yet planning an observation is practically
impossible—how can one define a universe of observation
with an unrepeatable slice of reality?
The degree of intelligibility of scientific understanding
calls for a number of additional definitions: The size of an
area of comprehension |C| is the number of words in Lm of
the comprehension C. The universality U of an area of
comprehension C is the reunion of all the slices of reality
that share this comprehension.
U ¼ [tfLmRtjC  LmRtg t ¼ 1; 2; . . .
An observation and an understanding are always finite. Yet
the domain of validity of an area of comprehension, its
universality U, may be infinitely large. This is not to say
that two infinite universalities must necessarily be the same
in size. For example, the laws of classical mechanics and
those of relativistic mechanics are finite. However, both
theories have infinite universalities even though classical
mechanics will always be contained in relativistic
mechanics when the reverse is not true. Cantor’s (1915)
theory is clear in this respect. There are infinite natural
numbers, infinite rational numbers, and infinite real num-
bers, yet the infinity of real numbers is greater than the
infinity of rationals, and the infinity of rationals is larger
than the infinity of naturals.
The Degree of Universality It is possible to establish an
order between different universalities, U1 and U2, simply
by defining that the degree of universality of U1 is greater
than that of U2 if the first contains the second. This cri-
terion is fundamental if the SM is, as we propose, to
demand the maximum universality possible.
The Degree of Intelligibility l The degree of intelligi-
bility l of an area of understanding depends on the rela-
tionship between the size of this understanding and the size
of the observation that preceded it. There are two aspects to
understanding: one derives from what is common to what
is different, and the other derives from the simplest
expression of the first. In this latter respect, the greater the
compression, the greater the understanding, enabling us to
formulate the degree of intelligibility in the following
manner:
l ¼ 1  Cj j= Oj j l 2 0; 1½ 
If l = 1, intelligibility is at its maximum and it occurs
when maximum comprehension corresponds to maximum
compression: |C| \\ |O|. At the other extreme, intelligi-
bility is at its lowest when l = 0, i.e., when the observation
is in itself also the best understanding: |C| = |O|. Chaitin-
Kolmogorov complexity theory illustrates this way of
seeing things (see the ‘‘Selection of the Comprehension
(OC) of a UO’’ section).
There are, then, degrees of intelligibility. The degree of
intelligibility of planetary motion is high since the size of
the understanding is finite (Newton’s three laws and the
law of gravitation), whereas the size of the observation
may be made infinitely large. Another slice of reality, such
as the behavior of a family group of gorillas, will
undoubtedly result in the size of the observation and the
size of the understanding being much closer. Different
ways of understanding a single reality can, therefore, be
arranged in order according to their degree of intelligibil-
ity. Kepler’s laws, for example, are a good understanding
of the motion of the planets around the sun, but Newton’s
laws have a greater degree of universality and intelligi-
bility. The degree of intelligibility will also lead to a good
criterion if it is appropriate, as is the case, that the SM
should demand the highest possible intelligibility.
The Three Fundamental Hypotheses (the Limits
of Scientific Understanding)
The SM that we are trying to design should be applied to
observable realities, understandable observations, and
understanding not shielded in advance against what may
occur in reality. Figure 1 shows the connections between
the three fundamental hypotheses: (1) reality is observable
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(RO); (2) observation is comprehensible (OC); and (3)
comprehension is falsifiable (CR) in relation to the three
initial concepts of reality (R), observation (O), and com-
prehension (C).
Reality is Observable (RO)
Not all realities are necessarily observable, but science
deals with those slices of reality that are. It is quite possible
in the case of a particular reality for it to be impossible to
build a universe of reference made up of other realities that
are directly or indirectly comparable. This, for example,
was the case with many elementary particles prior to the
construction of particle accelerators, and it is also the case
with many aspects of cosmology. The arguments of certain
critics of superstring theory (Glashow and Ginsparg1986)
are founded on the impossibility of observing or of man-
aging to observe it at work.
The unbridgeable gap that prevents us from scientifi-
cally understanding a superstition lies in the impossibility
of observing it at work. As will be seen, this hypothesis is
essential for stating the first principle of the scientific
method or the principle of objectivity.
Observation is Comprehensible (OC)
The observation of any slice of reality is not necessarily
understandable, but science deals with those observations
that are. Einstein’s remark that ‘‘the most incomprehensible
thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible’’ is in
this context pure irony. If we accept the definition of C, the
most sensible thing is to hope to find coincidences between
the differences when two realities are compared.
Metaphorically speaking, we can say that two branches have
something in common when they belong to the same tree. An
incomprehensible reality would correspond in the metaphor
to a forest with more trees than branches. And, in accordance
with prevailing cosmology, all realities have at least one
thing in common, their history. Intelligibility, however, also
has another meaning related to the weight of its expression.
In Chaitin and Kolmogorov’s algorithmic information the-
ory (Chaitin 1966), to give another example, an incompre-
hensible observation is one generated by an algorithm no
shorter in length than the sequence of digits that represents
the observation itself. In this sense of being understandable
by being compressible, the incomprehensible arises when
the best understanding is directly the minimal observation.
In the following section, we will discuss how these two
meanings of intelligibility are combined.
An observation may be completely incomprehensible if
the universe of reference has not been well selected. For
example, we are unlikely to arrive at an understanding of
the trajectory of a body launched in a field of constant
gravity if the positions, instances, and speeds have been
chosen from motions with arbitrary initial conditions.
The nonfulfillment of this hypothesis in either of its two
senses will push intelligibility to its lowest degree. Science
has nothing to contribute beyond this limit. As will be seen,
this hypothesis is essential for stating the second principle
of the scientific method, the principle of intelligibility.
Comprehension is Falsifiable (CR)
Not every understanding is falsifiable in the Popperian
sense of the term (Popper 1959), but science deals only
with understandings liable to enter into direct or indirect
contradiction with reality. In fact, falsifiability does not
necessary involve systematic observation. To determine the
non-falsifiability of a piece of presumed scientific under-
standing, all that is required is a simple perception of the
reality or the possibility that such a perception may be
imaginable by the individual seeking knowledge. This is
the meaning of the direct relationship that can be estab-
lished between the understanding and its reality in Fig. 1.
Falsifiability is necessary for paradoxes of contradiction to
arise between reality and the understanding of it when both
exist but it turns out that they are incompatible, or for para-
doxes of incompleteness to arise when one exists without the
other (i.e., when a reality exists without the corresponding
understanding or an understanding exists without a corre-
sponding reality). All those cases in which understanding is
unaffected by everything that may occur in reality are outside
the scope of science. For example, a prediction that covers
every possibility is assured of being compatible with reality,
yet it does not enter the realm of science because under-
standing can never enter into conflict with the understood. A
Fig. 1 The three fundamental hypotheses
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belief is just a belief, and no more than a belief, if it is
completely armored against anything happening in reality.
That which encompasses everything understands nothing.
Incoherence is the greatest means to avoid falsifiability, since
if a proposition is not correct, then its negation will always be
right. To attribute good luck to the satisfaction of the gods
and ill fortune to their anger is a belief that cannot possibly be
dealt with scientifically. As will be seen, this hypothesis is
essential to the statement of the third principle of scientific
method or the dialectical principle.
The three fundamental hypotheses, like every working
hypothesis, are neither the truth nor lies: they are either
accepted or they are not. In the case of scientific method,
the three hypotheses (Fig. 1) constitute an overall set of
criteria for demarking the scientific, in other words, the
realm in which the scientific method can be applied.
The Three Fundamental Principles (Scientific Method)
The understanding of a slice of reality is scientific if the
three principles stated below are abided by. Figure 2 shows
the three principles of scientific method and their rela-
tionship with the three fundamental concepts (reality,
observation, and comprehension).
Principle of Objectivity: Observation is Maximally
Objective
This principle affects the observation of a slice of reality
and has two meanings. The first refers to the distortion that
an observation may cause in the slice of reality being
observed merely due to the process of observation itself
(OR). The second refers to the opposite distortion, which a
particular slice of reality may cause in the observation by
the mere fact that its nuances may mask the essence (RO).
The principle of objectivity is, then, a two-part recom-
mendation to guide the selection of (1) the chosen method
of observation, and (2) the slice of reality chosen to be
observed. These two sub-principles establish a tendency to
be followed as closely as possible by the scientific method,
and are formulated in the following manner:
Selection of the Particular Manner of Observing
a Particular Slice of Reality (OR)
Scientific method recommends that of all the available
ways of perceiving a slice of reality, the one chosen should
be the one that least distorts the observed. The direct
benefit of this will be to attain the maximum universality of
the science vis-a`-vis the observer, in other words, the least
influence from her particular beliefs, prejudices, or
circumstances.
Selection of a Particular Universe of Observation Based
on a Slice of Reality (RO)
For a particular a slice of reality, one arrives at a set of
slices of reality called a universe of observation (UO) by
means of differences established in accordance with well-
defined parameters (such as time and/or space). An indi-
vidual observation of each of these slices of reality is
obtained, so the UO is a set of pairs in which each pair
consists of a particular slice of reality and its corresponding
observation, which, as mentioned above (in ‘‘Selection of
the Particular Manner of Observing a Particular Slice of
Reality (OR)’’), is the observation that least distorts it. The
direct benefit of this is to achieve the universality of sci-
ence vis-a`-vis the observed, in other words, that which
determines the breadth of the field of validity of the
resulting knowledge or, to put it another way, that which
makes the difference between a fundamental law, a phe-
nomenological law, or a simple ad hoc model.
Both the first hypothesis (the ‘‘Reality is Observable
(RO)’’ section) and the first principle (the ‘‘Principle of
Objectivity: Observation is Maximally Objective’’ section)
may be grouped together under the term ‘‘hypothesis of the
real world,’’ which is indebted to a reflection of ErwinFig. 2 The three fundamental principles
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Schro¨dinger (1944), who in turn drew his inspiration from
ancient Greek philosophy.
Principle of Intelligibility: The Understanding is
Maximally Intelligible
This principle affects the understanding of an observation
and governs a process that can go in one of two directions:
firstly, from observation to comprehension (OC); and sec-
ondly, from comprehension to observation (CO).
Selection of the Observations (CO)
Selection of the Observations (CO) of a universe of obser-
vation (UO) that have the highest possible intersection,
which we will term simply the intelligibility of the UO.
Example: A good universe of observation consists of all
the movements that are not too fast of bodies that are not
too small. What they have in common are the fundamental
laws of classical mechanics.
Selection of the Comprehension (OC)
Selection of the Comprehension (OC) of a UO. This is the
most compact way of expressing intelligibility. The most
compact form of understanding is arrived at using Newton’s
laws. The dual idea (‘‘Selection of the Observations (CO)’’
and ‘‘Selection of the Comprehension (OC) of a UO’’ sec-
tions) can be summed up by saying: the principle of intel-
ligibility tends to determine the minimum of a maximum.
The maximum emerges directly from the sense of the con-
cept according to the ‘‘Selection of the Observations (CO)’’
section (understanding is the maximum in common) and the
minimum proceeds from the ‘‘Selection of the Compre-
hension (OC) of a UO’’ section, inspired by the old idea of
Ockham’s razor (when two explanations give an account of
equal merit of a slice of reality, the simplest is chosen). The
combination of these two ideas driving in the opposite
direction has been explicitly stated by various authors, and
tacitly suggested by many others. In effect, the two senses of
understanding (as the common between the diverse on the
one hand, and comprehension as compression on the other)
are not alternatives, nor are they contradictory. Philip Kit-
cher (1981), for example, comments on this seeming
dilemma when he stresses the contrast between the strong
intuition expressed in the phrase understanding is to do with
the idea of reducing unfamiliar phenomena to familiar
phenomena (the idea of reduction) and Hempel’s intuition
(the idea of the common), expressed as follows:
What scientific explanation, especially theoretical
explanation, aims at is not (an) intuitive and highly
subjective kind of understanding, but an objective
kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic uni-
fication, by exhibiting phenomena as manifestations
of common, underlying structures and processes that
conform to specific testable, basic principles. (Hem-
pel 1966, p. 83)
Feigl (1970, p. 12) also sums up the integration of these
two selfsame meanings with equal priority: ‘‘The aim of
the scientific explanation throughout the ages has been
‘unification,’ i.e., the comprehending of a maximum of
facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical
concepts and assumptions.’’
Both senses have their tradition in history, albeit sepa-
rately. The first meaning (understanding through what is
common to the diverse) is known in the literature on the
subject as ‘‘understanding as unification’’ and has been well
argued by authors such as Weber (1996). The second
meaning (comprehension through compression) is bril-
liantly defined in Chaitin and Kolmogorov’s algorithmic
information theory (Chaitin 1966), which defines the
complexity of a sequence of data as that of the shortest
algorithm that generates it. The more compressible the data
of an observation, the greater the degree of understanding.
A sequence of a million figures of the type
010101010101… is highly compressible (and hence highly
understandable) to the much shorter proposition, for
example, of PRINT0110EXP6TIMES. In contrast, the
results of the last million football games played around the
world generate a totally incomprehensible series of digits.
The best way to represent these data is the sequence of data
itself. Consequently, we find ourselves at the opposite
extreme of the degree of intelligibility: it is the limit of zero
compression and hence also of the zero degree of com-
prehension. Consequently, there are, as in the case of
objectivity, also degrees of understanding, which lie
somewhere between a maximum and a minimum.
With this principle, scientific understanding acquires a
clear and profound utility, which is nothing less than the
ability to anticipate in the broadest meaning of the term.
We will discuss this in more detail below.
The second hypothesis and the second principle of the
SM are indebted to two intellectuals: (again) Erwin
Schro¨dinger (1944), and the medieval thinker William of
Ockham (Hempel 1966).
Dialectical Principle: Understanding is Coherent
(Without Paradoxes of Contradiction) and Complete
(Without Paradoxes of Incompleteness)
This principle ensures that the validity of an area of
understanding remains up-to-date due to its sensitivity
towards the same reality. It establishes that scientific
comprehension tends to be maximally coherent and
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complete. Between the slice of reality understood and the
slice of reality perceived (or observed), two types of par-
adoxes may arise: paradoxes of contradiction, and para-
doxes of incompleteness. Both cases are resolved by new
comprehension (RC) or by a new reality or way of per-
ceiving it (CR). In both cases, we can talk of the
advancement of scientific understanding.
A Paradox of Contradiction
A paradox of contradiction arises when an incompatibility
occurs between the understanding of a slice of reality and
its perception. In this case, there are two options for
restoring coherence: to change the understanding or to
change the slice of reality (or the perception of it).
New Comprehension Through a Paradox of Contradiction
(NCPC) If the incoherence is overcome by new com-
prehension (RC), then what we have is a scientific revo-
lution (the new understanding replaces the obsolete
understanding, the validity of which is at an end). All new
understanding can be termed a revolution.
Example: On 4 June 1999, a well-known generalist
science magazine published an article that put an end to
more than 100 years of contradiction between the then-
prevailing theory and an observation of reality. The authors
included the theoretical physicist Geoffrey B. West and the
biologists James H. Brown and Brian J. Enquist. The
irreconcilable difference was between the value of the
allometric exponent, which relates an individual’s mass
with its basal metabolic rate, observed in an extremely
broad universe of observation in reality (in the animal
kingdom, from a tiny shrew to a huge whale), and the value
deduced from the most reasonable hypothesis compatible
with prevailing thermodynamics. The first value was 3/4
and the second was 2/3; the first is ‘‘what we saw’’ and the
second is ‘‘what we believed’’ on the grounds that the
energy produced in a volume (proportional to the cube of
the distance) should dissipate through the surface that
separates it from the outside (proportional to the square of
the distance), assuming that the heat is generated, as in a
stove, uniformly at every point of the interior. The authors
of the article modified the hypothesis by assuming that heat
is not generated uniformly in the body but above all in the
fractal structure of the circulatory system. With this new
hypothesis, a new understanding was arrived at and a total
coincidence on the constant of 3/4 was achieved.
A New Reality through a Paradox of Contradiction
(NRPC) If, on the other hand, the paradox of contradiction
is resolved by changing the slice of reality affected by the
contradiction, then what we have is the emergence of a new
slice of reality (CR). This is when the domain of validity of
the understanding alters (for example, it shrinks) or when we
gain a better perception of this slice of reality. In this case,
we cannot speak of a scientific revolution but we can perhaps
talk of scientific evolution or progress. What is achieved is a
new reality without paradoxes with the prevailing theory.
Example: In November 2011, CERN reported that it
might have detected neutrinos traveling faster than light.
The contradiction with the special theory of relativity had
the scientific community in an uproar (Wright 2011) for
several weeks. However, a technical error was soon dis-
covered, resolving the matter in favor of the prevailing
special theory of relativity, which was thus strengthened.
A Paradox of Incompleteness
A Paradox of Incompleteness arises when a non-under-
stood reality or an understanding not perceived in the
reality is detected during an observation of reality, in other
words, when there is a lack of understanding or when there
is a lack of reality. This paradox has two forms, then.
New Comprehension Through a Paradox of Incomplete-
ness (NCPI) The first is illustrated by the phrase ‘‘I don’t
understand what I perceive’’ and is resolved by a scientific
revolution (RC).
Example: Over the millennia, numerous eyewitnesses
have been amazed when they have had the unlikely oppor-
tunity to see the spontaneous and capricious evolutions of
certain fireballs during dry storms in the desert. Dozens of
magical and mysterious interpretations have been put forward
since antiquity. Various thinkers such as Seneca, Benjamin
Franklin, Nikola Tesla, and Niels Bohr have attempted to use
intelligible knowledge to provide an explanation that would
make it possible to reproduce these spheres of fire (which vary
in diameter from one centimeter to a meter). Since then, a
number of groups of researchers have tried to simulate or
reproduce the phenomenon in the laboratory. Eventually,
Professor Pava˜o and his collegues (2007) managed to repro-
duce these mysterious fireballs and their behavior in the
laboratory. The word ‘‘mystery’’ is the name for failed
understanding of the ‘‘I do not understand what I can see’’
type; in this instance, it took several centuries before a
coherent understanding of the phenomenon was arrived at.
A New Perception of Reality Through a Paradox of
Incompleteness The second form of the paradox of
incompleteness is illustrated by the phrase ‘‘I cannot per-
ceive what I understand’’ and is resolved by improving the
observation (CR).
Example: On 4 July 2012, CERN announced that it had
in all likelihood detected the so-called Higgs boson. For
more than 40 years, the Standard Model of elementary
particles had predicted the existence of a particle that no
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one had been able to see (Witze 2012). During all this time,
there had been a paradox of incompleteness of the ‘‘I
cannot see what I understand’’ type.
The falsifiability of an area of understanding can be
directly established with the reality, or indirectly with the
mental representation of a reality. A non-falsifiable under-
standing is compatible with any kind of reality, regardless of
whether it has been observed or not. It is shielded against
anything that might occur in reality. One can also speak here
of degrees of falsifiability. The highest degree of falsifi-
ability arises when it is possible to design an experiment
whose results may contradict understanding, and the lowest
when the understanding is logically shielded against reality
(for example, ‘‘tomorrow one of two things will happen:
either there will be a solar eclipse or there will not’’). This
suggests that the third principle of SM is simply the formula
with the highest degree of falsifiability available.
The third hypothesis and the third principle of SM are
clearly indebted to Popper (1959) and his demand that
understanding should not shield itself from reality, to He-
gel’s dialectic (1977) on the cognitive power of contradic-
tions, and to the even more ancient roots of Plato’s ideas.
The Three Fundamental Benefits of the Scientific
Method (The Nature of Scientific Comprehension)
For each of the three hypotheses of the scientific method
there is, as we have seen, one of the three fundamental
principles. And now we will see how a great benefit of
knowledge is obtained from each of these principles. We
have already noted what the properties are that SM confers
on science. From objectivity between reality and observa-
tion we derive universality vis-a`-vis both the observed and
the observer; from intelligibility we derive anticipation vis-
a`-vis the understanding of observation; and from the dia-
lectic between understanding and reality, we derive the
capacity for progress of science, both in the sense of arriving
at new understanding and in the sense of promoting new
realities (see the following sections). Any other form of
knowledge, such as artistic or revealed knowledge, may be
universal and it may display one or more of these virtues, but
it is scientific knowledge that always ensures the highest
degree possible of these virtues at all times and in every
place. And this it does through the construction of the SM.
Figure 3 shows these virtues in the triple supporting schema
of reality, observation, and understanding. We will now go
on to discuss these relations in detail.
Universality
Universality is achieved in science in two ways (OR and
RO) thanks to the principle of objectivity that governs the
relationship between a slice of reality and its universe of
observation.
Universality vis-a`-vis the Observed (RO)
In the direction that goes from reality to observation, the
creation of a universe of observation, consisting of the
maximum intersection of slices of reality possible, ensures
that the scientific knowledge obtained is as independent as
possible from that which is observed. In other words, this
sense of the principle of objectivity tends to ensure that the
domain of validity of the reality to which it is applied is as
large as possible. This is what distinguishes a big theory
such as quantum physics from a phenomenological law
such as Ohm’s law, and this in turn from an ad hoc model
such as Lotka and Volterra’s law on the interaction
between predators and prey.
Universality vis-a`-vis the Observer (OR)
In the opposite direction, i.e., from observation to reality,
the principle of objectivity requires that the observation
should alter the observed as little as possible, as a
Fig. 3 The three fundamental benefits of the scientific method
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consequence of which another type of universality is
ensured. In this case, the impact of the particular precon-
ceived ideology of the observer, or her particular way of
observing, are tempered. Clearly, the more complex the
object, the more complicated this independence will be.
The observer will influence the trajectory of a billiard ball
less by watching it than he will the behavior of an animal
or while interviewing a patient on a couch. However, the
SM offers tendencies and even though the objectivity of an
economic observer will never attain the level of objectivity
of an astronomer, both deserve equally to be described as
scientific if they both apply their objectivity to the full.
Anticipation
This is the ultimate goal of the first utility of science.
Understanding reality in the sense of the principle of
objectivity of SM makes it possible to anticipate uncer-
tainty, an essential faculty for the survival of any being that
lives in the real world. Anticipation is a term that here
acquires a broad meaning. In fact, it not only means to
anticipate in time that we cannot as yet see because it has
not as yet occurred (an eclipse anticipated centuries
beforehand), but also means to ‘‘anticipate’’ in time that
which has already occurred but for which there was no
possibility of direct observation due to a lack of observers
or the means to do so (the geology of a landscape millennia
later). It also means, however, to ‘‘anticipate’’ in space in
the sense that scientific knowledge allows us to speculate
on phenomena that we cannot see because there are barriers
in space that block this observation (other planets, other
galaxies, etc.). In this case, it is perhaps more appropriate
to extend the meaning of the term ‘‘anticipate’’ than to
invent a neologism. Here, then, is the true meaning of
understanding that I advocate: the understanding of reality
anticipates in the sense that understanding serves to replace
the act of observing itself (CO). One observes in order to
understand, but with the prevailing understanding at hand
one no longer needs to observe everything. Understanding
replaces difficult, awkward, or impossible observations.
This is its profound meaning. What purpose does under-
standing serve? The answer could not be weightier: it is
undoubtedly the best strategy for surviving in the face of
uncertainty. We have arrived by natural selection at cul-
tural selection, so scientific understanding is an achieve-
ment with a great evolutionary tradition.
Progress
Science progresses thanks to, among other things, the
dialectical principle that governs the relationship between
reality and our scientific understanding of it. As we have
seen, there may be two types of progress: the generation of
new understanding, or the generation of a new reality. The
first means that preexisting knowledge becomes obsolete
when it is overtaken by the new; the second indicates that
there is an error in the perception of reality (as in the
aforementioned case of the detection of particles travelling
faster than light), or that the universality of the prevailing
knowledge now has a smaller domain of applicability (the
prevailing knowledge is more limited or more confined:
the theory of relativity does not rule out Newtonian
mechanics, but restricts it to low-speed scenarios). There
is little to add, then, to the discussion in the section above
discussing the ‘‘Dialectical Principle’’. The advance of
science is possible in accordance with the alternatives
described:
Progress Through New Understanding (RC)
In this case, the progress of science consists of the gener-
ation of new understanding, which in turn may occur, as we
have seen, in two ways: via the paradox of contradiction, or
via the paradox of incompleteness.
Progress Through New Reality (CR)
In this case, the progress of science consists of suggesting
changes to the way reality is perceived, which, as we have
also seen, may take place through the paradox of contra-
diction or the paradox of incompleteness.
This does not exclude the possibility that other intu-
itions, even those from outside science, may initiate a
process of renewal of scientific knowledge without the
need for coming across any kind of paradox with reality.
Indeed, SM is not useful for acquiring ideas that will lead
to renewal but it is for dealing with them.
The Three Intellectual Joys (Psychology
of the Acquisition of New Scientific Knowledge:
Research and Education)
The scientific understanding of reality is an activity of the
mind well equipped for survival. Gaining scientific
understanding became, in evolutionary terms, a vital
function for Homo sapiens. Now, a vital function is always
essential for the individual and his genes to endure: hunger
ensures feeding, thirst hydration, pain care of one’s own
health, sexual attraction descendents, and so on. Natural
selection favors the consolidation of stimuli without which
all these vital functions could be postponed—fatally post-
poned. Natural selection helps to overcome the obstinate
tendency of every living being to spend the minimum
energy and to expose itself as little as possible to uncer-
tainty. This is something that could easily be termed the
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universal principle of the laziness of matter: faced with the
dilemma of choosing between doing and not doing, the
individual tends to incline from the start towards not doing.
This is the function of stimulus: to avoid long postpone-
ments when urgent needs exist. Understanding, and espe-
cially scientific understanding, is a vital function that has
very recently appeared in evolution, and it is more than
likely that natural selection has not yet had sufficient time
to establish certain innate and indomitable stimuli to its
benefit. However, it is possible to speak of a certain
intellectual gratification that operates in the manner of
cultural stimulation. This is what we might appropriately
call intellectual joys, of which there are three broad groups.
The most surprising aspect is that each type of intellectual
joy is closely associated with one of the three principles of
the proposed SM.
There is an intellectual joy associated with the principle
of objectivity that we will term intellectual joy through
conversation; another associated with the principle of
intelligibility, intellectual joy through understanding; and a
third associated with the dialectical principle, intellectual
joy through paradox.
In short, SM is designed to guide the creation of new
science (research), but it is also useful for guiding the
passing on of science (education). Every process aimed at
the acquisition of new knowledge–whether ‘‘new’’ refers to
a particular citizen (education) or all the citizens in history
(research)–can be sensibly divided into three phases: (1)
stimuli, (2) conversation, and (3) understanding. Conver-
sation is prompted by the stimuli, and understanding is
prompted by some kind of conversation. The connection
between these three ideas and the three principles of SM is
described below.
Intellectual Joy Through Paradox
The process that leads to the acquisition of new scientific
knowledge begins with a stimulus. In which situations is
intellectual joy through paradox generated? I believe that
this can be precisely determined. The key lies in the third
principle of scientific method, i.e., in the dialectical prin-
ciple. It occurs when the creating mind perceives a threat to
a prevailing piece of knowledge. At that very moment, the
mind of the scientific subject experiences what we might
call intellectual joy through paradox. As described above in
the section on the ‘‘Dialectical Principle,’’ this can occur
with a paradox of contradiction or a paradox of incom-
pleteness. The mind intuits that it must fight the environ-
mental uncertainty in order to survive (let us not forget that
this intuition inspires this principle of SM). From this, two
pedagogical recommendations emerge: the first refers to
how good paradoxes should be sought, the second to the
best way to use them.
The Educational Value of Paradoxes: Looking
for and Using Paradoxes
Almost everything in our educational systems is based on
representations of reality: the teacher’s discourse, books,
videos, computers, etc. What is lacking for the occurrence
of paradoxes is delving into reality itself. The tendency to
hide paradoxes, as usually happens in many teaching
institutions, is a gross error. A good teacher, in contrast,
does not evade contradictions but looks for them. This
means that a considerable proportion of teaching needs to
be programmed outside the classroom; in other words, time
needs to be invested in going out into the outdoor reality to
gather stimuli. There is nothing more stimulating than
reality itself. Consequently, why not ‘‘Reality’’ as a school
or university subject? It is the best way to stir intellectual
joy through paradox.
The educational system tends to present science as a
closed doctrine to which the pupil comes lamentably too late
to contribute. Showing the method and discussing errors is
educationally very valuable in this early phase in which the
mind passes from a state of indolence to a state of keen
interest in learning. For example, science museums tend to
show the results of science but not the path that led to them.
The message of a rounded, perfect science, complete and
without cracks, looks nothing like a good stimulus. There is
no better conversation starter than a good paradox.
Intellectual Joy Through Conversation
The conversation begins when the individual in search of
knowledge has received sufficient, adequate stimuli. Con-
versation is not, however, valued in the classroom where,
in general, the discourse tends to flow in just one direction,
from teacher to pupil.
When and in what conditions does intellectual joy
associated with conversation occur? There is a subtle
answer to this subtle question. Any form of conversation on
SM consists of an exchange of questions and answers
between two interlocutors, one of whom is always the
human mind (the subject–in other words, the individual
wanting knowledge) while the other may be the perceived
or observed world (the object of knowledge), any other
mind (the exchange of ideas) or the subject’s own mind
(reflection). Intellectual joy associated with conversation
occurs whenever conversation supplies some kind of
innovation, that is to say, when the conversation does not
shut itself in by returning to the starting point but opens up
and takes different directions, so the point of arrival does
not coincide precisely with the point of departure. It is
when the perfect (vicious) circle turns into a kind of (vir-
tuous) cycloid. The precise moment of intellectual joy
through conversation occurs at the exact instant when the
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mind grasps that a point of arrival does not coincide with
any point visited before.
This intellectual joy is directly related to the first prin-
ciple of SM, with the principle of objectivity, which gov-
erns the best conditions in the interaction between the
subject and object. As indicated below, recommendations
of extreme usefulness to education can be drawn from this.
The Educational Value of Conversation
The second phase of the cognitive process is centered on
conversation, which is present in every process of new
scientific knowledge acquisition, and good ideas for edu-
cation can be drawn from this as well. Conversation is not
difficult to define and is framed in the alternation of the
reception and transmission of ideas: listening before
speaking, speaking after listening.
Everything in science is imbued with some kind of
conversation, but neither can there be teaching or education
without conversation. The educational system must there-
fore place value on conversation and train pupils in its art,
and it should be treated as an intellectually healthy and
useful activity. This conclusion is of course not news, but it
is something we have forgotten. It is the famous peripatetic
method employed by Aristotle, in which master and stu-
dents converse as they walk. Any educational system that
does not allocate time and space to conversation contains a
fundamental error in its core, as understanding is always
produced at the end of any form of conversation.
The educational system today generally extends over
some 20 years from nursery to a bachelor’s degree. As one
advances from the start to the end of this period, one can
easily see that the conversation between teachers and stu-
dents becomes increasingly difficult and one-way. In
classes crammed with students, all they can possibly do is
listen. There are a wide range of subjects nowadays, so
why isn’t there one given over expressly to conversation?
Everything to do with education should be conceived
from the perspective of stimulating and fostering conver-
sation, from the design of classrooms, lecture halls, and
cafeterias, to the design of museums and the formats of the
most diverse activities. For example, a museum, in which
everything is up against the wall, as is usually the case,
limits the likelihood of eyes meeting, thereby giving rise to
a conversation. The design of gardens, cafeterias, and other
meeting places in general ought to encourage conversation
rather than inhibit it.
Intellectual Joy Through Comprehension
We come at last to what we might call the moment of truth,
the intense emotion generated by the acquisition of new
understanding. Perhaps it could be said that new
understanding always comes suddenly, like that ‘‘Eureka!’’
moment experienced by Archimedes. What are the condi-
tions in which such an emotion is felt?
The clue lies once again in the SM, in its second prin-
ciple, the principle of intelligibility, and more particularly
it lies at the root of what it means to understand in science,
as detailed in the ‘‘Principle of Intelligibility: The Under-
standing is Maximally Intelligible’’ section. These are the
two columns on which scientific understanding rests:
finding the maximum in common between different slices
of reality (‘‘Selection of the Observations (CO)’’ section)
and reducing the expression of this to its simplest form
(‘‘Selection of the Comprehension (OC) of a UO’’ section).
Understanding Through the Maximum in Common
This point underpins much of the psychology of under-
standing. The mind constructs a universe of observation on
the basis of a shared reality and is moved when it discovers,
as it reviews them, additional intersections in principle
unforeseen whose validity extends beyond the initial uni-
verse of observation. Common to the motion of the planets in
the solar system is the fact that the planets orbit around a
single star. However, it is finding first Kepler’s laws and then
Newton’s laws as the element common to all these motions
that produces the tremendous emotion of understanding. At
the start comes the initial intuition, at the end the final
(currently prevailing) understanding. The second confirms
the first at the very moment of intellectual joy through
understanding. The emotion of this understanding lies not
only in the discovery of what is common hidden among
various and different slices of reality, but also in the finding
or suspicion that there are many more slices of reality that
share the same comprehension. In addition, the validity of
the understanding does not encompass just the planets
observed but all the planets around a single sun, the planets
of every sun, the suns themselves, and any body that travels
through the gravitational fields of the cosmos. Understand-
ing replaces observation. Archimedes’ legendary ‘‘Eureka!’’
sprang from a sudden understanding: the water that spilled
from his bath, which measured the volume of his body, could
also be used to measure the volume of any other irregularly
shaped object, such as the king’s gold crown. The greater the
number of slices of reality sharing an understanding, the
greater the universality of that understanding and its corre-
sponding psychological reward.
Understanding Through the Minimum of the Maximum
in Common
Whereas the situation described above has to do with a
maximum, this second situation has to do with a minimum.
It is a process of reduction that consists of separating the
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essence from the nuances, the information from the noise,
the central from the superfluous. This is understanding
through compression. Every time the subject manages to
reduce the essence of an area of understanding, intellectual
joy occurs. This is another psychological gratification
directly related to understanding. Polishing an area of
understanding until it is completely free of any superfluous
roughness brings with it, then, an intellectual joy. This also
occurs in the leap from Kepler’s laws to Newton’s laws,
mentioned earlier. This is the kind of intellectual joy that
occurs when, for example, a language is replaced by
another, more powerful one. Mechanics according to the
cumbersome fluxions of Newton in his Principia is dras-
tically reduced in the formulation of Hamilton or Lagrange
in accordance with the language of infinitesimal calculus
and differential equations. Landau’s and Lifshitz text
(1960) developing rational mechanics on the basis of a
variational principle is perhaps the expression of the
greatest and most elegant synthesis of this discipline in
physics.
The Educational Value of Understanding
All good education should encourage the occasioning of
direct intellectual joy while ensuring that it is not short-
circuited by any type of substitute. The ideal process is for
the mind to look for and discover this joy for itself, guided by
some form of conversation. The system of tests and exams to
evaluate pupils usually becomes a kind of request for them to
‘‘admit’’ or ‘‘pretend’’ that they have learned. But believing
the understanding of someone else is not the same as
attaining it for oneself. The difference lies precisely in the
occurrence or non-occurrence of intellectual joy.
How can the occasioning of true intellectual joy in the
classroom be encouraged? There is no easy answer to this
question, but it all revolves around creating the right con-
ditions by offering for consideration by the pupil slices of
reality linked together by the same understanding that is
open in turn to undergoing later compressions. I would like
to illustrate this point by mentioning an example taken from
my own experience in modern scientific museography.
On display in CosmoCaixa, the science museum in Bar-
celona, are three fossils of fish that share a single detail: in all
three cases, one sees a large fish that has half swallowed a
smaller fish (Solsona and Wagensberg 2002). The scene is
remarkable—how is it possible that in the three cases the
process of fossilization should have begun, tens of millions
of years ago, right at the moment when one fish had half
eaten another (see Fig. 4)? The mere contemplation of these
three objects suggests that understanding is lacking. In
effect, observing in reality a frequent phenomenon that the
mind believes to be infrequent simply means that the mind
lacks a certain understanding of reality. We have before us a
paradox of incompleteness (as discussed in that-named
section above). The universe of observation in this case
consists of the three fossils that, though different, have
something in common, which is precisely what has deter-
mined their selection. In this example, a fine intervention
from the good teacher who wants to induce understanding
perhaps consists solely in reminding pupils of the meaning
of the concept of understanding in science and of encour-
aging them to find what other things might also be shared by
such slices of reality (the maximum in common). Observa-
tion guided in this manner immediately bears fruit because
in the three cases the big fish is too small to eat a small fish
that is too big. In this way, intellectual joy suddenly hits the
pupil (or the researcher in taphonomy studying the case for
the first time). As a result, the first recommendation of
looking for and finding the maximum in common is fulfilled.
There is a second recommendation left, which is that the
expression of this maximum should be minimal. For
example, the large fish choked and the small fish drowned,
causing the death of both, after which they were fossilized.
The researcher (or teacher) then decides on whether it is
appropriate to explore the validity of this theory by looking
for more pieces in order to extend the universe of observa-
tion. This manner of inducing intellectual joy through
understanding is already being successfully used in modern
scientific museography, and in raising awareness of science
(Wagensberg et al. 1996, 1997). However, there are serious
doubts as to whether this idea can be transposed to schools
and universities.
Conclusions
There are two types of conclusions. The first is related to
the existence, uniqueness, and validity of the SM (even
outside science), and the second to the psychological
Fig. 4 Photograph of a fossil on display at CosmoCaixa science
museum in Barcelona. It is one of three fossils there all showing the
same type of remarkable scene: the big fish is too small to swallow a
small fish that is too big
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implications of the SM, which are of particular importance
in research and education programs.
On the Existence and Uniqueness of the Scientific
Method
The question of the existence and uniqueness of a scientific
method can be resolved in a circular manner by proposing
that we define science as any kind of knowledge produced
in accordance with the three fundamental principles of the
SM (as discussed above). There is, however, still one thing
left to do: to match this definition with scientists’ percep-
tion of this form of knowledge over the course of history.
Finding a discipline whose scientific nature deserves the
consensus of the scientific community but which does not
meet the three fundamental principles of the scientific
method would be sufficient, for example, to cast doubt on
both its validity and its uniqueness.
The key to the SM we present here lies in the fact that
the three properties resulting from its application (objec-
tivity, intelligibility, and the dialectic with reality) are not
absolute values but admit degrees between a maximum and
a minimum. This means that a particular understanding of a
slice of reality may have a higher degree of objectivity than
another rival understanding of the same slice of reality. The
same may also be said of the degree of intelligibility or the
degree of falsifiability. Now, given that the fundamental
principles recommend the highest possible degree attain-
able in each instance, every piece of knowledge will be
characterized in principle by a certain degree of ‘‘scienti-
ficity,’’ that is to say, the degree of intensity with which it
was possible to apply the SM. This degree, which is
influenced by the complexity of the slice of reality to be
understood, is clear: the scientific understanding of the
trajectory of a billiard ball will score more highly than the
understanding of the behavior of a family group of mam-
mals. But it should be said that, in accordance with the
definition, both pieces of knowledge will be equally sci-
entific if they both display the maximum degree available.
The SM simply recommends that objectivity, intelligi-
bility, and the dialectical capacity of the knowledge be
ensured to the maximum extent. This is how scientific
knowledge of a particular slice of matter advances. Cos-
mology according to Ptolemy was science until Coperni-
cus, and his was science until Kepler, whose theories were
regarded as science until Newton, and, in all truth, New-
ton’s was science until Einstein. The SM also defines the
validity of a particular piece of scientific knowledge.
Each of the three fundamental principles of the SM is
necessary, but only the set of all three is sufficient. Ful-
fillment of the dialectical principle, for example, is a nec-
essary but insufficient criterion. Astrology would score
highly with the dialectical principle because there are no
ambiguities or doubts concerning its falsifiability. How-
ever, it would fail catastrophically as regards its intelligi-
bility and objectivity. Homeopathy, another example, may
have few problems with its objectivity but it does in rela-
tion to its falsifiability (always hidden behind the placebo
effect) and intelligibility. Psychoanalysis has often been
criticized for its problems of falsifiability, yet the greatest
or least consideration of the SM will produce more or less
scientific versions of this extremely complex discipline.
For good reason there are psychoanalysts who regard
themselves as scientists and others who do not.
The task of reviewing the whole of the history of science
armed with the SM far exceeds the ambition of this article,
but suggesting it is part of its conclusions. The history of
physics clearly emerges well from an analysis of scientificity
using the SM, except perhaps for a few cases that are still the
subject of fierce debate due to problems with their obser-
vation. This is unquestionably the case of superstrings or
certain theories on complex systems. There can be no doubt
that in these instances, the SM can be a good tool for debate
and critique and for guiding those who find themselves
immersed in these areas of research. The finding that the SM
has been applied avant la lettre throughout the history of
science is the equivalent of confirming that the scientist uses
the SM, even if tacitly, whenever he engages in science.
In any event, there is another way of assessing the
compatibility of the SM with what has been regarded over
the course of history as scientific theories. This involves
analyzing the various scientific methodologies on which
these theories were based, and verifying whether they share
what we have here put forward as an SM. A good historical
and critical analysis of the science done via inductivism,
via the conventionalism of Whewell and Duhem (1906), be
it in honor of Popper’s views on falsifiability, Lakatos’s
research programs, or even the examples raised by Fey-
erabend (1974) to deny the existence of a presumed sci-
entific method, would confirm that the SM is a necessary
and sufficient condition in every case (Lakatos 1971). None
of these methodologies on its own is both necessary and
sufficient. Popper’s idea of falsifiability, for example, has
been the subject of lively debate, but in general this has
been in the context of an overall philosophy of science.
Falsifiability is, of course, necessary but it is not enough. In
our suggestion, Popper’s sublime idea is contained in what
we have termed the dialectical principle. Falsifiability in
the SM does not represent an overall ideology but a pow-
erful idea that serves to focus the demarcation of scientific
knowledge and guarantees the possibility that scientific
knowledge will advance. The SM is useful in order to do
science but does not itself necessarily have to abide by its
own principles. Something similar could be argued with
regard to inductivism and the meaning that we here accord
to understanding. There are two ingredients to our proposal
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concerning the notion of understanding in science: one is
related to what is shared in common by things that are
diverse; and the other is related to the minimal expression
of what is shared. The idea of induction is based solely on
the first of these two aspects.
The SM is thus a requisite to be fulfilled by any disci-
pline that hopes to be described as scientific, but perhaps it
is also something more, though not an obligation but an
option. An artist, for example, can choose to be more or
less scientific without this diminishing or adding to the
merit of his work. A scientist does not have this freedom. A
scientist can only be scientific if she employs objectivity,
intelligibility, and dialectics to the fullest. Newtonian
physics and psychology, for example, would be equally
scientific because they strive to be as objective as possible.
If the method is employed to the full, then psychology is
scientific, but this is not true if the method is abandoned.
The SM is applied with decreasing intensity in accor-
dance with the complexity of the slice of reality to be
understood. Perhaps it is not too frivolous to arrange dis-
ciplines in decreasing order of how far it is possible to go
with the SM: physics, biology, ethology, economics,
sociology, and so on. The degrees of objectivity, intelli-
gibility, and dialectics become increasingly difficult to
attain as the complexity of the reality rises. We stress,
however, that using the SM is a decision of the knowledge
creator, and that the idea of obtaining results with the
minimum preconceived ideology possible seems at the
outset useful in all these disciplines. And it can be said that
they are all equally scientific because in all of them the SM
attempts to go as far as possible.
In contrast, one can be a great artist without the need to
involve oneself with the SM. An artist can but he is not
obliged to adopt the principle of objectivity: Albrecht Du¨rer
and Alfred Hitchcock are two examples of artists who were
not overly interested in distancing themselves from their
work. An artist can but is not obliged to look for the simplest
expression of the maximum that is shared in common. This
was the choice made by Jorge Luis Borges, Pablo Picasso, or
Salvador Dalı´, but not by Vincent Van Gogh or Marcel
Proust and, once again, they are no less artists because of
that. The artist can play with paradoxes but is under no
obligation to resolve them. Many artists go through a clearly
scientific phase during which they look for their own lan-
guage, but then move on from this stage once they have
found it, as is the case with Antoni Ta`pies and Joan Miro´.
Others explore new languages until the very end of their
careers, as is true of Pablo Picasso and Antoni Gaudı´.
Education and the Scientific Method
Each of the three phases for acquiring new scientific
knowledge is directly linked to one of the fundamental
principles of the method: the stimulus phase to the dia-
lectical principle; the conversation phase to the principle of
objectivity; and the understanding phase to the principle of
intelligibility.
Stimuli
Stimuli in general are a natural requirement (the product of
natural selection) that guarantee the continuation of the
vital functions of a living individual. Perhaps the closest
we have to it are curiosity and play, which is a neotenic
property in the case of humans. Pedagogically, the message
is clear: immersion in the reality of the world is to be
fostered. Or to put it another way, remoteness from reality
is to be avoided. This brings us to the following phase,
conversation. It is not surprising that the same principle of
the SM that guarantees the advancement of science should
also suggest good conditions for learning.
Conversation
Conversation is, in any of its forms, the essential path that
leads to an understanding of reality. The first principle of
the SM governs the way we should conduct those con-
versations that foster the twofold universality of scientific
knowledge: independence from the particular reality to be
known (the universality of the object) and independence
from the particular ideology of the person who has the
knowledge (universality of the subject). The importance of
this when it comes to passing scientific knowledge on to
others is beyond doubt. Good schools and universities and
the most creative periods in the history of humankind (such
as Florence during the Renaissance and Austria in the
1920s) make time and space for conversation.
Understanding
Understanding marks the moment of truth in education, and
the second principle of the SM is devoted to it. If there is
anything capable of instilling an addiction to knowledge it
is the joy associated with understanding. Any hijacking,
simulation, or substitute for intellectual joy is a serious
handicap. The nub of the matter is that the last phase of the
conversation that leads the pupil to attain understanding
should be based above all on conversation with himself,
reflection. It is not difficult to achieve this in museums. In
classrooms, however, attaining this proves not to be so
immediate, and it requires special research and effort.
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